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Abstract
Philosophical issues such as free will and the role of consciousness in human 
action have become a topic of interest to neuroscience. While this contribution 
is of great value to extend our knowledge on these issues, the lack of clarity 
about the concepts being investigated may interfere with the interpretation 
of the relevant results. An interesting experiment (Bode et al., 2011) that 
investigates whether decisions are generated consciously or unconsciously 
suggests a conclusion about whether human beings decide freely. These 
issues are considered relevant philosophical issues, but the experiment lacks 
conceptual precision, and this weighs on the interpretations of data and results. 
I argue that further conceptual analysis of decisions shows that the experiment 
investigates one kind of decision, while it unwarrantedly draws conclusions 
about human decisions in general. A better understanding of what is considered 
to be a decision helps clarify to which extent the results show that decisions 
are generated unconsciously. This shows that conceptual precision is crucial 
for research on the area as well as methodological rigor.
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Resumo
Questões fi losófi cas como a do livre-arbítrio e o papel da consciência nas 
ações humanas se tornaram temas de interesse para a neurociência. Porém, 
ao mesmo tempo em que essa contribuição é valiosa para estender o nosso 
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conhecimento a respeito dessas questões, a falta de clareza conceitual a 
respeito dos conceitos que estão sendo investigados pode interferir na 
interpretação dos resultados. Um experimento interessante (Bode et al., 2011) 
que investiga se decisões são geradas consciente ou inconscientemente sugere 
uma conclusão sobre se os seres humanos decidem livremente. Essas questões 
são consideradas questões fi losófi cas importantes; entretanto, como falta ao 
experimento precisão conceitual, isso pesa na interpretação dos dados e dos 
resultados. Argumentarei que uma análise conceitual das decisões mostra 
que o experimento investiga apenas um tipo de decisão, enquanto sugere 
uma conclusão injustifi cada sobre as decisões humanas de modo geral. Uma 
melhor compreensão do que se consideram decisões ajuda a clarifi car até que 
ponto os resultados mostram que as decisões são geradas inconscientemente. 
Isso mostra que precisão conceitual é crucial para pesquisas nessa área tanto 
quanto precisão metodológica. 
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Introduction
In Tracking the Unconscious Generation of Free Decisions Using Ultra-High 
Field fMRI (Bode et al., 2011), it is claimed that it is possible to decode the content 
of a free decision up to 7 seconds before the subject is aware of what this content 
might be—i.e., before she is aware of what she will decide. Functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) showed that relevant patterns of brain activity could be 
decoded to yield predictive information about the decision, and showed that the 
relevant activity stabilizes over time as the moment of its awareness approaches.2
The research aimed at investigating the relationship between the subjective 
aspect (consciousness of deciding) and the objective aspect (brain activity) during a 
decision task. It follows the line of research developed and made famous by Benja-
min Libet (1985, 1999; Libet et al., 1983); both the participants’ reports about their 
conscious states and measurements of the relevant brain activity were taken into con-
sideration. Bode et al. claim that their research disclosed new information about how 
humans make decisions. Furthermore, the experimenters assume that our experience 
of freedom would be an illusion if our actions were decided upon unconsciously, and 
their results lead them to conclude that our decisions are generated unconsciously.
I will argue that the term decision can be understood in different ways and 
that Bode et al. are investigating a specific kind of decision, which does not yield 
evidence for drawing conclusions about decisions in general. Therefore, their con-
clusion is ungrounded.3 
In the second section the experiment will be described. In the third section I 
will distinguish between four different kinds of decisions, extending Alfred Mele’s 
(2000, 2003) conception of deciding. In the fourth section I will argue that the ex-
periment reported in Bode et al. only investigates one kind of decision; therefore, 
2 The experiment (Bode et al., 2011) aimed at reproducing an experiment by Soon et al. (2008), focusing on 
a smaller area with the objective of being more accurate.
3 Similarly, Mele (2009) objects to Libet’s (1985, 1999; Libet et al., 1983) generalization of his findings. Libet 
generalizes his conclusion that the brain events related to the preparation to act start well before the subjects 
are conscious that they want to flex their finger; as if this conclusion could be applied to all intentional actions. 
Like the experiment in question (Bode et al., 2011), the scope of Libet et al.’s (1983) experiment seems to be 
too limited to allow for conclusions about all human intentional actions.
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the experimenters have no grounds to draw conclusions about human decisions in 
general. Finally, in the fifth section I will argue that the way that the experimenters 
conceive of our experience of freedom makes it impossible for their experiment to 
investigate this experience, so their results give them no grounds to claim that this 
experience is an illusion. 
The experiment
The participants in the experiment were instructed to hold two video game 
joysticks, one in each hand, and then immediately push one of the buttons, right 
or left, when they decided which button to push (Bode et al., 2011). There was no 
time restriction on the task execution. The participants should just relax, not think 
about the task they should execute, and not previously plan which button to press. 
They should just wait until they had made their decision.
The participants were told to only observe a screen on which a consonant 
appeared every 0.5 s while they waited to decide (Bode et al., 2011, p. 2). They 
were supposed to report which letter was on the screen as they became aware of 
their decision, in order to allow the experimenters access to the moment at which 
they became aware of their decision. The experimenters used fMRI to observe the 
subjects’ brain activity occurring during the experiment.
The experiment is interpreted in the following manner:
Interestingly, we observed an increase in similarity between patterns with increas-
ing temporal proximity to the conscious decision. This increase in correlation was 
mirrored by the increase in information content about the decision outcome. Thus, 
one possible explanation for this fi nding is that during the unconscious phase of 
intention-formation, the patterns slowly “evolved” towards the fi nal conscious deci-
sion, comparable to a diffusion process postulated for fast, stimulus-driven decisions. 
This hypothesis states that once a threshold is crossed (a certain pattern is stable 
enough), a conscious decision is made and activation patterns lose their predictive 
power afterwards (Bode et al., 2011, p. 9).
Bode et al. (2011) describe as their main discovery their finding that the con-
tent of the decision4 is encoded in the brain activity well before the subject became 
conscious of her decision.5 An explanation as to why the experimenters considered 
this their main finding may be because they expected that the consciousness of 
the decision would carry this information (about which button the subject would 
press) and not the brain activity preceding consciousness of the decision. In the fifth 
section it will be argued that this led Bode and others to believe that the agent is 
not free to decide which actions she performs.
Because it was possible to decode which button the subject would press a 
few seconds before the subject reported being conscious of her choice, the observed 
activity patterns were interpreted as a prediction of the subject’s decision before 
4 The content of the decision would probably be something like “press the right button” or “press the 
left button”.
5 “It was possible to decode the decision outcomes of such free motor decisions from the pole of anterior 
medial prefrontal cortex (BA 10) and the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), up to 7 s before subjects 
were aware of their intention. The results clearly pointed to frontopolar cortex (FPC) as one possible site of 
origin for free decisions” (Bode et al., 2011, p. 2).
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the subject herself was aware of the decision she would make.6 Bode et al. claim 
that the activity patterns carrying the decision information strengthened during the 
seconds throughout which the activity was observed, but the subject had not yet 
reported to be conscious of her decision. 
From the results, the experimenters questioned the general notion that we 
make our decisions consciously in the sense that we consciously originate the deci-
sion. They claim that this could be an illusion (Bode et al., 2011, p. 1), given that 
the participants of the experiment were not aware of their decisions until well after 
the predictive brain activity had already begun.
Conceptual background
Decisions can be reflective or unreflective
What Bode et al. (2011) are investigating, however, is not what they are draw-
ing conclusions about. This is the case because they are investigating one kind of 
decision, while they are drawing conclusions about decisions in general. Therefore, 
their conclusions are unwarranted. Some may even refuse to call these decisions; 
nonetheless, even if we accept that they are decisions, this would still not allow for 
the point made by the experimenters.
In this section, I will distinguish between four kinds of decisions: active and 
reflective decisions, active and unreflective decisions, non-active and reflective 
decisions, and non-active and unreflective decisions. More will be said about the 
different kinds of decisions further in this section, but first some previous distinc-
tions must be made.
Consider these two situations: when I decide to get myself a new sweater, I 
take into consideration how much I need a new sweater, the current season, and my 
budget. This is very different from deciding which key to press when my computer 
screen shows the message “press any key to continue”. 
In the examples above there is a difference between the kinds of decisions I 
make in each one.7 Pressing any key might be a non-active kind of decision, as will 
be explained. This is different, though, from deciding whether to buy a sweater 
based on my needs and available financial resources, or from deciding to take a 
vacation instead of working. We may very well call these decisions, but there seems 
to be a difference between them. What is the difference?
At first glance it is easy to see that the decision to purchase the sweater in-
volves reflection, while the one about which key to press on a keyboard out of the 
many available keys does not involve reflection. I will distinguish these two kinds of 
decisions by calling the former reflective decisions and the latter unreflective deci-
sions. The decision about which key to press does not depend on reflection at all. It 
is indifferent; as long as I press one key, the task is complete. What I would like to 
call attention to is that Bode et al.’s (2011) experiment does not involve decisions 
of the sweater buying kind.
6 Subjects were instructed not to pre-plan their decisions, and Bode and others believe that “our detailed 
behavioral analysis confi rmed that subjects did not use any systematic thoughts to consciously prepare their 
decision ahead of time. They acted as instructed and were spontaneous” (Bode et al., 2011, p. 9).
7 Mele notes the distinction between picking and deciding in Effective Intentions (2009). However, the 
distinction that Mele (2009, p. 84-85) draws is between picking amongst indifferent options and deciding 
amongst options the agent actually deliberates about. It is the distinction between arbitrarily picking an option 
and deciding that involves deliberation. 
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Decisions can be actions or not active
Nevertheless, this is not the only distinction that ca be made amongst deci-
sions. Intending to do something is not an action in itself, while deciding may be. 
Deciding may be actively doing something. For instance, if I have doubts about what 
to do this afternoon and then decide to go to a lecture at another department, that 
is something I do, and I may also acquire the intention to walk there (in opposi-
tion to taking the campus bus).8 I do not need to actively form this intention, it is 
acquired as a result of my decision, and acquiring this intention is not an action 
(Mele, 2003). Deciding to go to the lecture was an action of mine.9 So this is also a 
distinctive aspect about decisions; they may be active or non-active.10
A question, however, remains. If the acquisition of an intention already plays 
a causal role in the production of intentional actions and active deciding would 
be intentional under some description (Davidson, 1980), why would we need to 
decide? Why would we need to form intentions? And in what circumstances would 
a decision about what to do be needed? In various everyday situations the agent 
simply acquires the intention to do A, without the need to make a practical deci-
sion. So, a decision is only necessary in circumstances in which the acquisition of 
an intention is not enough, or does not happen. 
According to Mele (2003), these decisions (that are actions) are made in situ-
ations where there is a practical uncertainty that has not been resolved by a cogni-
tive decision. When the agent makes a decision about what is best to do without 
thereby acquiring an intention to act accordingly, then she needs to take a further 
step: decide what to do. Thus, these decisions occur in situations where the agent 
has doubts about what she should do; for example, Georgia is in doubt about 
whether to accept an invitation to dine with her friends or stay home to watch the 
live broadcast of a concert. Even though she suspects that she may have more fun 
with her friends, she still does not consider the case closed until the time comes 
when she must get ready to leave or let her friends know that she will stay home. 
Georgia knows that she needs to make a decision. 
In cases when the agent does not actively decide what to do, once the agent 
evaluates what is best to do, her intention to decide what to do gives her motivation 
to generate an intention in accordance with the conclusion of her assessment and 
to act accordingly. When actively deciding what to do, the motivation to solve the 
practical uncertainty in question already present in the intention to decide what to do 
8 One of the characteristics of decisions is resolution, as is the case of intentions. So, when an agent, Sara, 
intends to go to a lecture in the afternoon, we do not think that maybe she will go, or that she wants to go, 
or that she is refl ecting on whether she will go. Unless something out of the ordinary happens — according 
to this theory intentions may be revoked (Mele, 2003, 2009; Bratman, 1999) — we can assume that Sara will 
go to the lecture. Suppose I am in doubt about whether to go to the library this afternoon or meet Sara at 
the lecture. If I then decide to go to the lecture, I am not still deliberating about whether to go and I am not 
unsettled about whether I will go. Having decided suggests that I will be at the lecture this afternoon (for I 
have formed the intention to be there), and Sara can expect me there.
9 Mele (2003) claims that decisions to act are actions of forming an intention to do A. And these decisions are 
actions just like the action of lifting one’s arm; however, decisions are mental actions. I disagree that decisions 
to act are always actions, since I claim that there may be non-active decisions, which Mele (1992, 2003) would 
probably call intention acquisition.
10 A distinction between decisions to act and decisions that are not about action could also be made (Mele, 
2003). For example, I can reflect and decide that the global use of the method of Aztec agriculture would be 
better to preserve the planet’s resources. Or a decision about what would be best; e.g., in order to not throw 
the local environment out of balance it would be best if it rained soon. These examples are not of decisions to 
do something, i.e., to act. It is clear that the experimenters wished the participants to make a decision to act: 
to push the left or right button of the joystick; in this investigation, however, we will not take this distinction 
into consideration. 
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explains the agent’s disposition to form an intention in accordance with the delibera-
tion about the issue once she reaches a conclusion. So we have reasons to believe 
that we at least sometimes actively decide when we have doubts about what to do.
Different kinds of decisions
Taking into consideration the distinction drawn between reflective and unreflec-
tive decisions, one concludes that active decisions may be reflective or unreflective. 
Nonetheless, decisions may also not be of the active kind. I distinguish between ac-
tive or non-active decisions. Still, more conceptual clarity is needed before analyzing 
what kind of decision the subjects in Bode et al.’s (2011) experiment were making.
 It is now clear that there may be four different senses of decisions: (i) active 
and reflective decisions (I shall call these ARD, for short), (ii) active and unreflective 
decisions (AUD), (iii) non-active and reflective decisions (NRD), and (iv) non-active 
and unreflective decisions (NUD). I believe that it is not polemical that we decide 
in the active reflective sense described above; after all, this seems to be what we 
commonly mean when we talk about deciding. However, there is also active decid-
ing in which the agent makes a decision without reflecting.
For instance, suppose I have some spare time to do my laundry, but I do not 
know whether to wash my blacks or colors first. I must decide soon, because I only 
have so much time to spend on this task, but I really see no reason to wash either 
of them first (I do not need to wear any of these clothes any time soon). Actually, 
since I can wash one pile of clothing first and still have time to wash the other pile, 
there really seems to be no reason to prefer doing either task first. Still I must decide 
soon or I will do neither. It is just a question of deciding with which pile to start. 
In this case I may actively decide to wash the blacks first without going through a 
reflective process beforehand. I bring myself to form a decision. Since this kind of 
deciding is an action, just as reflective decisions, they fit into the active decisions 
category. It is a case of AUD.
I do not mean that in this case the agent decides for no reason. There may be 
a number of unconscious reasons, biases, and previous experiences that influence 
her decisions. These subjacent mechanisms probably tip the scale. All that I mean is 
that the agent does not actually base her decision on any previous reflection about 
what to do. She just decides, perhaps biased by the cited factors.
There are also decisions that are not active in the sense that they are not 
actions, but the agent acquires an intention to act in accordance with one of the 
action courses open to her at the time. It is possible for a decision to be reflective, 
but not active, in the sense that it leads the agent to acquire an intention to act in 
accordance with the outcome of her reflection without the need to actively form 
the intention. This is the case of NRD. Once the agent’s reasoning favors an option, 
she acquires an intention to act accordingly; for example, one may reflect about 
what would be the best move in a chess game. This deliberation surely is active; 
however, once the agent comes to a conclusion about which would be the best 
move—say knight on c6—she may just acquire the intention to act accordingly, 
which is not active.11 An interesting point is that in this kind of decision the agent is 
not faced with unresolved uncertainty. Reasoning about what is best to do resolves 
11 This becomes even clearer if the agent is just watching a chess game, say her friends are playing chess. She 
may watch and deliberate about which would be the best move to make and come to a conclusion about it. This 
would be her decision, but she would not have to perform the action of deciding. She simply decides once she 
fi gures out the best move, and she will also not act on that conclusion because she is just the audience to the 
game. Had she been playing, she would probably acquire the intention to act in accordance with her decision.
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the issue for her, so there is no need for an active decision in the face of a question 
about what to do. 
There is, however, a sense of decision that is non-active and unreflective, NUD, 
which is what happens when an agent does not reflect about her options, because 
she is not faced with any uncertainty at all, but we may still call this a decision in 
some sense. The agent simply acquires the intention to take a certain course of ac-
tion; this is the case of common intention acquisition.12 An example is the decision 
about which key to press when the message “press any key to continue” appears on 
my computer screen. Usually I just press any key with either my right or left hand.
If someone asked me when I had become conscious of my decision about which 
key to press, I would probably say that I was not aware of any decision at the time; 
I just pressed any key. Or if someone asked me to pay attention and report on the 
consciousness of my decision next time I press a key in this situation, then I would 
probably report on becoming aware of my resolution to press one of the keys. But that 
seems much like acquiring an intention to press the key and becoming aware of it.
Deciding in the experiment
What kind of decision is investigated by the experiment discussed by Bode et 
al. (2011)? I will argue that the experiment in question investigates NUD, but the 
experimenters draw a conclusion about decisions in general. 
Since subjects were asked to press a button, either on their left or right hand 
joystick, without thinking about it, while relaxing and waiting for the decision to 
come up, it is clear that unreflective decisions are the focus of the experiment. 
“Subjects were instructed to passively view the stream of letters, relax, and refrain 
from thinking about the upcoming task” (Bode et al., 2011, p. 2). If they followed 
the experiment’s instructions to not think about or pre-plan their decision, they did 
not make reflective decisions.13 
Furthermore, if subjects followed the instruction not to think about the 
upcoming task, it is hard to imagine that they might have decided in the active 
sense of deciding at all. It is unclear how one can make a decision in the active 
sense without entertaining the question about what to do, or at least that there is 
a question. If one does not even raise a question about what to do, then there is 
no decision to make. 
I have tried to actively decide between sitting on the left or the right side of 
my dining table without thinking about the task that I should perform. In order 
to do that, I must think about something else. So I find myself thinking of other 
things until either: (i) I remember that I must decide, in which case I have failed to 
not think about the task; or (ii) I acquire the intention to sit on the left (or right) 
and then I become aware of it, in which case I have not actively decided. Another 
possibility would be to have preplanned the decision, but this was not allowed in 
the experiment.
12 In this sense I consider non-active unrefl ective decision interchangeable with acquired intention.
13 Bode et al. (2011) only used the results from participants who naturally balanced their decisions. The subjects 
were not informed of this in order not to bias their decisions. Nonetheless, Lages and Jaworska (2012) suggest 
that in this kind of experiment, in which the task involves pressing a left or a right button, subjects will be 
inclined to balance out their button pressing and will keep track of which button they have previously pressed 
in order to do so. Hence, it is hard to rule out this tendency as some form of pre-planning. See Mele (2014, 
p. 202) for a distinction between inclination and decision.
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The instruction to avoid thinking about the options takes away any practi-
cal uncertainty the subject might be faced with. Because if one must not entertain 
the thought that one must decide between the options, then one surely does not 
have any doubts about what to do, nor is one troubled in any way by options. The 
question about what to do never arises. So, the subject could not have decided in 
order to solve a practical uncertainty, since there was no uncertainty that needed 
further action or reflection.14
If the subjects complied with the experiment’s instructions, their decision was 
of the NUD kind (Bode et al., 2011). From what was discussed above, it is prob-
able that they acquired the intention to press one of the buttons and then became 
aware of their intention. 
After all, we do not need to actively decide beforehand to perform every one 
of our actions. If active decisions were necessary for every action production, we 
would be less efficient agents and we would take longer to act, especially if it were 
the kind of decision that requires reflection to be involved in the process. Also con-
scious processes are slower and take up more resources, so if we needed to make 
a reflective decision every time we acted (assuming that reflection is conscious), 
action production would be slower and more energy-consuming.
On the other hand, the acquisition of an intention is not an action. Agents 
may passively acquire intentions, and we do so frequently (Mele, 2003). For instance, 
when I decide to go to the movie theatre to watch a particular movie, I acquire the 
intention to buy myself the tickets without having to actively form the intention or 
even think about it.
The acquisition of an intention to act now—or the neural activity that realizes15 
it—is the last step before acting. This last step involves a commitment of the agent 
to the action, in the sense that once the agent acquires the intention to do A, she 
is settled on doing A.16 So the acquisition of an intention is what initiates the ac-
tion mechanisms. In the experiment it could be that the activity pattern strengthens 
until the subject settles on the action course, i.e., acquires the intention to act in 
accordance with the content encoded in the activity pattern.17
Brass and Haggard (2008) defend the hypothesis that the production of every 
intentional action involves at least three information-generation components that 
they call deciding: action selection, i.e., (a) what action will be executed; (b) time 
selection, which would generate information about when the action should be 
executed; and (c) information generation of whether one should act at all, which 
could involve a veto of the implementation of action or not18. All these three action 
generation processes would depend on different neural processes. Acting intention-
14 Waller (2012) makes a related point. She points out that some neuroscience experiments, such as Libet et 
al. (1983) and Soon et al. (2008), do not test what experimenters intend to test—conscious intentions and 
decisions, respectively—in a relevant way because the kind of action that subjects are instructed to perform 
in the experiments is too far from our everyday actions.
15 I use the term realize to claim that there is a relation between mental events and brain activity, but I remain 
neutral as to what relation this might be.
16 Unless the agent revokes her intention in time to prevent the triggering of the relevant action mechanisms 
(Bratman, 1999).
17 Haggard (2008) also suggests that the frontopolar predictive activity pattern found by a similar experiment—
Soon et al. (2008)—could antecede the activity observed in pre-SMA and SMA; he associates the latter to what 
he calls what decision and when decision. Haggard claims that the activity described by Soon and others may 
be explained by forethought: “These patterns may represent an earlier stage in the causal chain that generates 
actions (see above). Neural processes such as the readiness potential must clearly have antecedent causes, and 
more-sensitive measurement techniques may reveal the earlier stages in the chain. Alternatively, these very 
early activations might be associated with forethought and longer-range conscious intention, as the same 
brain areas are known to be involved in prospective memory” (Haggard 2008, p. 942).
18 Krieghoff et al. (2009) also corroborate this hypothesis.
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ally (considered purposive) would require this information generation, which Brass 
and Haggard (2008) contrast to stimulus-driven actions, like reflexes.
So, following the hypothesis that information generation processes are part 
of the production of action, we may accept that in every situation in which an 
agent may act she is faced with multiple possible courses of action. Say I take a 
short break from work. I will have many options about what to do next: I may now 
return to work, check the message I just got on my phone, get one more slice of 
cheese, make some tea, etc. In reality, it is hard to name the courses of action that 
would be open to me because there are so many of them.
We may suppose that factors such as my skills, emotional situation at the 
time, current interests and concerns, past experiences, and psychological dispositions 
may help limit the action courses that I would at least be inclined to take. Given 
the kind of person I am, my interests and my daily routine, I will probably just get 
back to work for now. Most of the times I do not need to actually reflect on what I 
will do, I just follow my routine. At other moments, however, I may need to make 
a decision about it; e.g. I may have doubts about what to do when there is no food 
left in the house, but I still have work to do.
This openness of options would then be part of all action production; none-
theless, this does not mean that every action depends on the agent deciding what 
to do in a reflective or active sense of deciding. For example, I do not reflectively 
and actively decide in this sense about whether to take my purse when I leave the 
house; I just take it. The acquisition of an intention settles my course of action. So, 
if it is the case that in the process of producing every action there is this openness 
of options, but active decisions are not necessary for all of them, then this kind of 
decision is not called for simply by having options. We may conclude that active 
decisions are called for when there is actual doubt about what to do.
If the subjects were deciding which button to press, then their decision was a 
NUD, if they complied with the experiment’s instructions (Bode et al., 2011). Possibly 
they simply acquired the intention to press one of the buttons and became aware 
of that acquisition at some point. However we interpret the experiment, one thing 
seems clear: it does not study reflective or active decisions. 
Since UND are a different mental state, it is probable that they have different 
neural correlates than other kinds of decisions, and this would be what was observed 
in the experiment.19 However, this evidence does not offer any information about 
the neural correlates of the other kinds of decisions described above. It might not 
be possible to make any predictions about the content of decisions before aware-
ness in the case of other kinds of decisions; for different brain activity might predict 
decisions of one kind well in advance, but not of other kinds.
It is important to know what is being investigated in their experiment because 
it does not match the conclusions being drawn from it (Bode et al., 2011). I have 
argued that the task is too specific; the subjects are instructed to carry out a NUD in 
the experiment. However, the problem is that it is not about this sense of decision 
that the experimenters draw their conclusions. On the contrary, Bode et al. (2011) 
draw conclusions about human deciding in general.
When we talk about decisions, we usually mean it in a narrower sense than 
NUD. The word decision is used when we are deciding our plans for the evening, 
career options, where to go on vacation, what to eat for lunch, or even for decid-
ing which clothes to wear. 
19 One may argue as well that the different kinds of decisions have different functional roles.
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Of course, by this I do not mean that the word can never be used to refer 
to NUD. However, Bode et al. do not make clear in which sense they mean their 
use of the word, nor do they qualify their usage of it: “These findings support the 
conclusion that frontopolar cortex is part of a network of brain regions that shape 
conscious decisions long before they reach conscious awareness” (Bode et al., 2011, 
p. 12).20 So, when they draw these conclusions, they seem to be making a claim 
about decisions in general, which their experiment gives them no ground to make.
The reference to “conscious decisions” (Bode et al., 2011, p. 12) and to the 
“ability to consciously choose our actions” (2011, p. 1) indicates that the experiment-
ers might be referring to all kinds of decisions, not only NUD. However, I have argued 
that their experiment investigates only one sense of decisions: NUD. Therefore, this 
specific task does not warrant extrapolating their findings to all kinds of decisions. 
Free will
The experimenters also make claims about human freedom in making deci-
sions. What freedom, or acting freely, is can be controversial.21 For this reason, I 
will use the term here in the way that Bode et al. (2011) use it. Here is how they 
understand freedom: 
As humans, we experience the ability to consciously choose our actions as well as the 
time at which we perform them. It has been postulated, however, that this subjec-
tive experience of freedom may be no more than an illusion and even our goals and 
motivations can operate outside of our consciousness (Bode et al., 2011, p. 1).
So, the freedom that we experience, according to Bode et al. (2011), is as-
sociated with the experience of being able to consciously decide on our actions and 
the time at which we act. The subjective experience of freedom would be an illusion 
if the experience did not correspond to us actually having this freedom. 
The claim that the experience of freedom that we have when we consciously 
choose could be an illusion, followed by the claim that even our goals and motiva-
tions could operate outside of consciousness, shows that, in this conception, our 
freedom depends on our consciously choosing our actions. Therefore, the experi-
ence of freedom would be an illusion if deciding about our actions and their timing 
happened outside of consciousness. 
To make sense of the statement that our experience of freedom may be an 
illusion, one is led to believe that Bode et al. (2011) mean that if we were free, then 
it would not be possible to decode the information about which button the subject 
was going to press before she was conscious of it. It would not be enough that the 
subject should become conscious of her decision after the information was already 
pre-existent unconsciously (about 7 seconds before consciousness of the decision).
So, Bode et al. (2011) are making a claim about our experience when they 
say that we freely—i.e. consciously—decide which actions to perform and at which 
20 According to Huo et al. (2014), there may be reasons for caution before ruling out any other activity relevant 
to the task that may have been occurring at the time. Huo et al. found evidence that some brain activities do 
not show a hemodynamic signal (the signal that shows that there has been use of blood oxygen in a certain 
area of the brain); therefore it is possible that other activities that are not picked up by fMRI could be happening 
alongside activities that do produce hemodynamic signals simultaneously during an fMRI experiment. Perhaps 
a pattern of activity that realizes the gradual buildup of the consciousness of the decision process would not 
produce a hemodynamic signal.
21 Some may prefer the term Free Will to refer to human freedom of action.
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moment. They claim that this experience is in fact an illusion, because the outcome 
of the decision is already predictable before the subjects were conscious of it, which 
is what they believe that their experiment shows.22 Therefore, our experience of 
freedom would be an illusion, because we do not freely—consciously—decide on 
our actions or their timing. 
There is, nonetheless, a second sense in which the term free, or freedom, refers 
to the conditions in which the experiment (Bode et al., 2011) was done and to the 
instructions about it. This must not be confused with the experience of freedom:
[…] only those subjects who inherently fulfi lled important criteria were selected for 
the fMRI session. First, the frequency with which a subject chose each of the two 
possible outcomes (left button or right button) needed to be balanced, meaning 
that one option should not have been chosen more than twice as often as the other. 
Second, we selected subjects that ‘‘naturally’’ performed trials at a moderate pace 
(i.e., at a speed of 15 to 50 seconds per trial). […] These fi rst two criteria were not 
known to the subjects such that they had maximal freedom in their decisions, but it 
was specifi cally emphasized that their decisions should be unbiased and spontaneous 
(Bode et al., 2011, p. 2).
In this sense, a free decision is one that actually does not have any constraint 
imposed on it by the experimental conditions or by the experiment instructions. 
There was no external restriction or direction about which button the subjects should 
press. There was no restraint on the balance of their decisions (how many right or 
left choices), nor on the time they had for each action. In this case, the decisions 
were considered free just in the sense that there was no external restraint to them. 
This lack of restraint does not depend on consciousness; it depends on the lack of 
restrictions or directions stipulated by the experiment’s instructions: “Subjects were 
free to decide, at any time, to press the left or the right button with the correspond-
ing index finger” (Bode et al., 2011, p. 2).
This is not the same as the experience of freedom that we have when we 
act. This is the freedom of having no external restriction. To avoid confusion with 
the first sense of the term freedom discussed above, I will call these unrestrained 
decisions, not free decisions. 
To make clear the distinction we may imagine that a wrestler feels like she 
is free to act as she wishes, in the sense that there is no intrinsic impossibility to 
her movements entailed by her human condition, or, in the terms Bode et al. use, 
she feels that she consciously chooses her actions. The wrestler may decide which 
strategy to apply against her opponent; however, she may also find her move-
ments restrained at a certain moment, because her opponent is pinning her down. 
Her opponent is imposing an external restriction on her actions at the moment in 
question.23 In the sense of freedom applied in the experiment, though, we would 
certainly not say that the opponent has restricted the wrestler’s freedom to choose 
her actions and their timing. She can still try to move, even if she fails to have the 
strength to get out of her opponent’s grip. 
22 Miller and Schwarz (2014), however, have proposed that consciousness may not be all-or-nothing; it may be 
gradual. In this case, the strengthening of the pattern of activity could be related to the subjects’ supposedly 
heightening degree of consciousness alongside the strengthening of the patterns of activity that produce the 
decision.
23 Of course, this is a kind of restraint that is different from that of an instruction about what to do. The analogy 
being made is that the experiment instruction tries not to limit how the subjects of the experiment may move 
(which button to press) nor the moment that they may move. In this sense, it grants the kind of freedom to 
the subject that the wrestler is taking away from her opponent by pinning her down.
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Keeping these distinctions in mind, it is possible to understand why the experi-
menters believe that our experience that we freely decide which actions to perform 
and at what moment we will perform them is an illusion. This is the case because 
they interpret the experiment as having revealed that unconscious processes already 
carry information about which button the subject will press—i.e., which action she 
will perform—before she is conscious of it. So the content of the decision is already 
settled before the decision is conscious. 
“These findings support the conclusion that frontopolar cortex is part of a 
network of brain regions that shape conscious decisions long before they reach 
conscious awareness” (Bode et al., 2011, p. 12). This is considered evidence for 
the claim that our experience of freedom is an illusion because even in the case of 
unrestrained decisions, it is claimed that the subjects’ decision about their action 
and the timing of their action was encoded unconsciously. Bode et al. present the 
experiment as evidence that we are not free to make these decisions, or at least 
that is what we are supposed to understand based on their results.
The problem with this interpretation of the results of the experiment is that 
it is stated as if a discovery about our freedom was made that would show that 
our experience of freedom is an illusion. However, if Bode et al. understand that 
consciousness is necessary for this kind of freedom, the experiment’s instructions 
seem to make it impossible for this freedom to actually be investigated by it. The 
subjects were clearly instructed to not think about the decision they were supposed 
to make. They probably thought of something else during the experiment;24 in this 
way they drove their conscious attention away from the task. This is a different 
procedure from the one in which we, for instance, reflectively decide to act, of 
which we are usually conscious.
So the experimenters have set the experiment up in such a way that con-
sciousness does not interfere in their measurements, and then they conclude that 
the experiment showed that the subjects did not exercise their freedom in deciding, 
because the information about the decision could be decoded before the subjects 
were conscious of it. It seems like they designed the experiment in such a way that 
subjects would not consciously entertain the decision about their action. Although 
they ran an experiment on unrestrained decisions, it is a stretch to draw any conclu-
sion about the experience of freedom, even under their own conception of it, and 
whether or not it is an illusion under their conception of freedom.
Had their experiment involved reflective decisions, then their conception 
of freedom could have been investigated by the experiment. However, this is not 
the case. Therefore, Bode et al. (2011) are not warranted in drawing conclusions 
about our freedom to decide on our actions, as they conceive it, nor about reflec-
tive decisions for that matter. They may draw conclusions about NUD, which are 
passively acquired.
Conclusions
It was argued above that Bode et al. (2011) conduct an experiment on NUD 
and that it offers interesting findings on those. Nonetheless, the conclusions they 
draw about reflective or active decisions based on their results are not warranted 
by the latter. 
24 In a questionnaire “most subjects reported that they did not have specifi c thoughts they could remember. 
Some reported having thought about (or mentally read) the letters, some reported having occasionally thought 
about daily activities but none reported having thought about the decisions” (Bode et al., 2011, p. 6).
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The experiment’s instructions do not allow the subjects to consciously enter-
tain the decision about which button to press, because they were not supposed to 
think about the task that they were expected to perform. So it is hard to see how 
the information about which button to press could have originated consciously. 
Therefore, it is not possible to draw any conclusions about our experience of free-
dom according to the conception of this experience offered by Bode et al. (2011) 
themselves. 
This shows that an experiment of this kind that involves subjective and objec-
tive data requires conceptual caution. The above discussion of the conceptual issues 
related to the study led to a different interpretation of the results. This may be a 
useful and important philosophical contribution to neuroscientific investigation, 
especially those investigations involving philosophical issues such as consciousness 
and human freedom. 
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